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Liability of a Trade Union for the Actions of Its 
Members: A Case for Strict Liability
J. GORDON PETRIE*
This article discusses the civil liability o f a trade union fo r  the 
actions o f its members. It is submitted that, in view o f provisions 
in the N ew Brunswick Industrial Relations Act and  Jud icatu re 
Act, such liability should be strictly imposed. This would not 
unfairly burden the union and would clarify the requirement o f  
pleadings, a difficulty often fac in g  practitioners.
Dans cet article, l'auteur examine la question de la responsabilité 
civile des syndicats du fa i t  des actes de leurs membres et fa it valoir 
qu'il y aurait lieu de les assujettir à un régime de responsabilité 
stricte au vu des dispositions de la Loi sur les relations industrielles 
et de la Loi sur l’organisation judiciaire. Un tel régime 
n'imposerait pas un fardeau  excessif aux syndicats et clarifierait 
les conditions de forme auxquelles doit satisfaire la rédaction des 
conclusions, tâche qui est souvent source de difficultés pour le 
practicien dans ce domaine.
T h ere  has been in New Brunswick an observable increase in actions 
brought by em ployers, o r groups o f employers, against trade unions for 
dam ages resulting from  alleged unlawful strikes and /o r unlawful 
picketing. This paper briefly examines one o f  the fundam ental issues 
which invariably arises in the majority o f  such litigation, namely, the 
extent to which the trade union is liable for the actions o f  its m em bers 
who participate in such unlawful activity.
T he  existing state o f the law is, at best, confusing and contradictory. 
It is the view o f this writer that a clear delineation o f  the responsibility 
o f the union is possible, without im posing an unfair burden  on the 
union, by the application o f  the principle o f  strict liability.
Since the decision o f  the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada in International 
Brotherhood o f Teamsters etc., Local No. 21 3  v. Therien1 it has been clearly 
established that, absent legislation to the contrary, a trade union is a legal 
entity capable o f suing and being sued in its own right. This principle 
has been applied to a trade union as defined by the Industrial Relations 
Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4 in Rocca Construction Ltd. et al. v. Local 1279,
♦B.A., 1962, LL.B., 1964 (U .N.B.), L.L.M., 1965 (M ichigan). Senior P artner, Petrie and Richm ond, 
F redericton .
'( I9 6 0 ). 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1 (O nt. C.A.).
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Labourers International U nion2, where the New Brunswick C ourt o f 
Appeal stated:
In other words, it is a course o f  conduct carried on by the employees, not by 
the union itself, which, in this case, is the subject matter o f the action. A 
union becomes involved and liable when it instigates, encourages, participates 
in, or fails in a duty to discourage, an illegal strike.
There is no question in this case but that the defendant is liable in 
damages if the strike was illegal. See Winnipeg Builders' Exchange v. 
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 2085  57 D.L.R. (2d) 141 and 
International Brotherhood o f Teamsters v. Therien 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1, [1960] 8 
S.C.R. 265.3
T h e  basis upon which liability was imposed in the Therien case is 
expressed by Mr. Justice Locke in the following m anner:
In the absence o f  anything to show a contrary intention —  and there is 
nothing here — the Legislature must be taken to have intended that the 
creature o f  the statute shall have the same duties and that its funds shall be 
subject to the same liabilities as the general law would impose on a private 
individual doing the same thing. Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus.
In my opinion, the appellant is a legal entity which may be made liable in 
name for damages either for breach o f  provision o f  the Labour Relations Act or 
under the common law.4
T h e  provisions o f the Industrial Relations Act similarly provide that a 
trade union is the exclusive bargaining agent for all employees in the 
bargaining unit for which it has obtained bargaining rights.
It is this legislative direction o f exclusiveness that ought, in this 
w riter’s opinion, to impose a heavy bu rden  upon a trade union in the 
event o f  an unlawful strike in breach o f a ‘no strike’ clause. It is, 
however, subm itted that the rules have developed to date in such a 
m anner that a trade union may escape liability in situations where, given 
the responsibilities o f such exclusive bargaining rights, a d ifferen t result 
should be necessitated.
T h e  im portance o f this issue to a practitioner is illustrated in the 
decision o f Stevenson J. in Brunswick Contractors (1 9 7 7 ) Ltd. v. United 
Brotherhood o f Carpenters and Joiners o f America, Local 1 1 3 7 . 5 T he  
Defendant moved to strike out the P laintiffs statem ent o f claim on the 
basis that it failed to disclose a reasonable cause o f action. Specifically, 
the statem ent o f  claim did not allege any particular w rongful activities o f
2N.B.C.A., u n rep o rted  dec ision delivered  O ctober 12, 1979.
;lIhui., at 4.
*(1979). 2fi N.B.R (2d) 2 M  (N.B Q  B ).
*Supra, footnote I. at II.
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the officials o f  the union but ra th er it alleged that the union perm itted 
the unlawful strike to occur w ithout affirm ative action to prevent same.
T h e  decision o f  Stevenson J . states in part as follows:
I do not propose, on an application o f  this kind, to attempt either an 
exhaustive or definitive review o f  the case law dealing with the liability o f  a 
union to an employer for damages the latter may suffer as the result o f  an 
illegal strike. I cannot accept, without qualification, the proposition o f  counsel 
for the plaintiff that the union is responsible for any breach o f  the collective 
agreement bv its members. Paragraph 10 o f  the statement o f  claim assumes 
the existence o f  such an absolute responsibility or liability. In my opinion no 
such absolute or strict liability exists in the absence o f  some statutory rule or 
presumption as was present in Pacific Press Ltd. v. Vancouver Typographical 
Union Local 226  (1970), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 212___
Liability has not been limited to cases to where union officers or officials 
have actively participated in or condoned the strike action (acts o f  
commission) but has also been found when such persons have failed to take 
prompt and affirmative action to bring strikes to an end (acts o f  omission).8
T h e  appropriateness o f  pleadings in litigation o f this natu re  thus 
assumes a most im portant status. T h e  difficulties inherent in succeeding 
in a representative action brought against the employees in the 
bargaining unit, and not the trade union, are revealed by the decision in 
Heath Steele M ines Ltd. v. Kelly et al. T h e  following statem ent by Limerick 
J. A. is illustrative o f  the problems:
The subject matter o f  this action must depend on a common interest and, on 
the facts o f  this case, must depend on the intent o f  each member o f  the class 
to enforce his will on the employer to revoke the dismissal o f  a fellow 
employee fired for disciplinary reasons. If actionable, the plaintiffs claim 
must rest on a conspiracy by the members o f  the described class to cause the 
em ployer’s business to be shut down or adversely affected by an illegal strike.
In such event there could be different defences available to different 
individuals in the group. A number o f  the group may have actively 
participated in a conspiracy to force the employer to shut down his business.
A further number o f  employees may not have engaged in the active 
conspiracy but refrained from reporting for work when they learned the 
strike had been called by others. A third group o f the em ployees may not 
have been sympathetic with the strike and opposed to it but. stayed o ff  work 
because o f  a reluctance (union inspired) to cross picket lines and other 
employees, who wished to work, may have been intimidated by the presence 
o f  the pickets. Each such group o f  employees would have an arguable defence  
not available to other persons included in the class sought to be sued.7
T h e  following provisions o f the Judicature Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. J-2, 
are relevant to the issue o f liability and the appropria te  form ulation o f 
the action:
35(1) A trade union, a council o f  trade unions, an employer and- an 
employers’ organization, as defined in the Industrial Relations Act, are legal 
entities capable o f  suing and being sued.
7( 1978), 22 N.B.R. (2d) 7. at 13-14 (N.B.C.A.).
•Ibid., at ‘->68-269.
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35(2) No representative action in tort shall be brought against members o f  
a trade union as defined in the Industrial Relations Act 1971, c. 42, s. 3 .8
An arbitral award by Professor Laskin, as he then was, established 
the applicable rules regard ing  the role and responsibility o f officers and 
stewards respectively. In Canadian General Electric Co. Ltd. it was stated:
It need hardly be said that in order to discharge its affirmative obligation it is 
not enough for the Union to go through the motions o f  giving back-to-work 
orders without more. In the case o f  a strike or stoppage called by the Union, 
its liability is fixed at the very time the prohibited act occurs. In the case o f  a 
spontaneous or wildcat strike or stoppage, liability o f  the Union depends on 
the action taken by it, having regard to its responsibility for its members and 
for non-members. There must be prompt attempts to get the employees back 
4 to work. T he nature and extent o f  these attempts will depend on the 
circumstances and the situation with which the Union is confronted. It may 
well be necessary for the Union, if uncoordinated efforts by its stewards and 
officers to terminate the stoppage are unsuccessful, to make concerted efforts 
and to obtain the permission o f  management to call a meeting on the 
premises for that purpose. It may be necessary to threaten, and even to take, 
disciplinary measures against particular members o f  the Union. At all events, 
it would seem that the initial obligation o f  the Union should be to make 
known to management that the Union has not authorized or encouraged the 
stoppage and thereafter to give continued evidence o f  this postion by 
manifest steps to bring the stoppage to an end. It may, o f  course, be finally 
necessary for the Union to report to management that it cannot control its 
members or other employees, thus leaving it to management to take such 
action as it sees fit. Such a procedure, in the Board’s view, is consistent both 
with Union responsibility for contractual undertakings and with employer 
responsibility for directing the working force. It does not throw an absolute 
liability on the Union but enables it to exculpate itself by tangible evidence of  
its good faith in meeting its undertaking. . .9
T h e New Brunswick Suprem e C ourt, Appeal Division, adopted this 
line o f  reasoning in Re N ew Brunswick Electric Power Commission et al. 
H ughes C.J.N.B. stated as follows:
Certainly a trade union cannot be held either criminally or civilly liable for an 
illegal strike which it has neither authorized nor encouraged through the acts 
o f  its officials or agents, and which it has endeavoured to terminate by 
affirmative action: R v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 
I S I S  (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 607, 10 C.C.C. (2d) 88, 4 N.S.R. (2d) 556 
(N.S.C.A.). In my opinion the same principle should be applied where a strike 
is carried on in violation o f a Court order. T o render a trade union criminally 
responsible for disobedience o f  such an order there must be evidence which 
incriminates the union.10
T h e  basis o f an action for dam ages against a trade union with 
bargaining rights most f requently arises out o f  a breach o f the ‘no strike’ 
clause. T h e  Industrial Relations Act by section 53(1), requires that every
"For a sim ilar provision see the  Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B., 1973, c. 1-4, s. I 14(2).
*( 1951). 2 l..A.( (>08 at (il I -(>12; see also Re Oil and Atomic Workers and Polymer (Corporation Ltd. (1958),
Id  !.. A.C. 31. at 39-40.
"’(1977). 73 D I R (3d) 94, at 101 (N.B.C.A.).
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collective agreem ent contains such a provision o r else it is deem ed to be 
present.
It is a breach o f this very provision that has been held to constitute 
an appropria te  basis for the issuance o f an injunction, the term s o f 
which require the term ination o f an unlawful strike: see International 
Brotherhood o f Electrical Workers, Local Union 2 0 8 5  et al. v. Winnipeg  
Builders' Exchange et a l .11 T h e  Suprem e C ourt o f C anada specifically 
rejected the argum ent that the issuance o f an injunction in such 
circum stances was tantam ount to com pelling employees to work for a 
particular em ployer contrary to the long-established rule o f equity set 
out in Lumley v. W agner.12 It is subm itted that a fu rth e r judicial 
determ ination  bears most im portantly on the role and responsibility 
o f  a trade union. In M cGavin Toastmaster Ltd. v. Ainscough et al. C hief 
Justice Laskin stated:
T he reality is, and has been for many years now throughout Canada, that 
individual relationships as between employer and employee have meaning 
only at the hiring stage and even then there are qualifications which arise by 
reason o f  union security clauses in collective agreements. T he common law as 
it applies to individual employment contracts is no longer relevant to 
employer-employee relations governed by a collective agreement which, as 
the one involved here, deals with discharge, termination o f employment, 
severance pay and a host o f other matters that have been negotiated between 
union and company as the principal parties thereto.13
Finally, the Suprem e C ourt o f C anada in International Longshoremen's 
Association, Local 2 7 3  et al. v. M aritime Employer's Association et al. 
considered the propriety o f an injunction issued against trade unions 
which obtained bargaining rights under the Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 
1978, c. L-l as am ended. It was held by Estey J.S.C. that:
T he language o f  the contract placed an affirmative duty on the union acting 
through its leaders at all levels o f  the organization so as to reveal an intent through 
appropriate overt acts to abide by and to promote the terms o f the collective 
agreement. The evidence on the record in these proceedings is quite the opposite.
Not only is there no evidence on the part o f the union through its agents, that is its 
officers, to perform the undertaking given in the articles set forth above, but, on the 
contrary , the leaders o f the Locals themselves failed to respond to the request by the 
association to report for work. In the same way, the Locals violated their covenants 
in the collective agreements to supply the numbers o f  employees requistioned by the 
employers in the manner prescribed in the agreements. . . .  It may be said that the 
addition o f  the “officers, members and servants” is superfluous because the Locals, 
like other legal entities, may only act through such persons.14
“ (1968). 65 D.L.R. (2d) 242 (S.C.C.).
'*(1852), 42 fc.R. 687 (C.h.D.).
'»(1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) I. at 6 (S.C.C.).
M(1979), 89 D.1..R. (3d) 289, at 306 (S.C.C.).
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T h e Suprem e C ourt fu rth e r approved the following com m ent by 
Robertson J.A . in Pacific Press Ltd. v. Vancouver Typographical Union, Local
226:
In the ease at bar, each o f  the unions covenanted with the respondent that 
the respondent "shall be protected by the Union against walkouts, strikes or 
boycotts by members o f  the Union and against any other form o f  concerted 
interference by them with the usual regular operation o f  any o f  its 
departments o f  labour”. For the Court merely to require the union not to 
"cause" any o f  those things would fall far short o f  requiring the union to 
perform its undertaking to “protect” the respondent therefrom; the words 
"permitting" and “allowing” are — or one o f  them, for I think they are 
synonymous in this context, is — essential to ensure that the union performs 
what it has covenanted to do. T here is no good reason why each o f  the 
unions should not be ordered to do what it agreed to d o .15
T he C ourts have thus displayed a p roper identification o f the 
responsibility o f the trade  union for a breach o f a ‘no strike’ provision 
and, where appropriate, have displayed no reticence in issuing an 
injunction to prohibit such a breach. T h e  related issue o f the 
responsibility o f a trade union for a breach o f the same clause due to the 
actions o f its m em bers has not, however, received a similar clear 
treatm ent.
T he  definition o f “strike” in the Industrial Relations Act is set forth in 
Section 1:
"strike" includes a cessation o f  work, a refusal to work or to continue to work by 
employees in combination or in concert or in accordance with a common 
understanding, or a slow-down or other concerted activity on the part o f  employees 
designed to restrict or limit output, but no act or thing required by the provisions o f  
a collective agreement for the safety or health o f  employees shall be deem ed to be 
an activity intended to restrict or limit output; ‘to strike’ has a corresponding 
meaning;
T he necessity o f “concerted activity” presupposes the involvement o f 
m ore than one person. T h e  provisions o f most collective agreem ents, 
however, relate to the contracting parties (i.e. the trade union and the 
em ployer) undertak ing  that d u rin g  the life o f such agreem ent there will 
be no strike o r lockout. It is subm itted that, at the very m inim um , such a 
provision ought to impose strict liability upon the parties. For a 
discussion o f the principles applicable to strict liability and absolute 
liability in the quasi-criminal field see R. v. City o f Sault Ste. M arie . 16
T h e  trade union has acquired rights and privileges u n d er the 
relevant labour legislation which have been recognized as sufficient to 
constitute such bodies as legal entities. T h e  undertak ing  by contract that 
there  shall be 'no strike’ du rin g  a specified period is an act o f  that entity, 
albeit executed through its officers o r their bargaining representatives.
••(11*71 ), 15 D.l. R (3d) 212, at 225 (B .C.C.A .).
’*( M*7H). 85 D I R (3d) 161 (S.C.C.).
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T h e  breach o f such a fundam ental term  o f a collective agreem ent has 
been recognized to impose a certain burden  upon the trade union.
T h e  troublesom e aspect o f certain judicial decisions is that it would 
appear that liability would not be imposed »upon the union for the 
breach o f the ‘no strike’ clause, unless the em ployer is able to establish 
the appropria te  acts o f  commission o r omission by the officials o f the 
union. For exam ple, on the one hand, if an unlawful strike occurs and 
all officials o f the union nonetheless continue working, does the union 
thereby escape liability? Is the m ere sending o f a telegram  ordering  
m em bers to re tu rn  to work (a most popular practice, it appears) an 
effective device to exculpate the union? On the o ther hand, does the 
absence from  work o f the union officials during  the period o f an 
unlawful strike create liability?
T h e  various illustrations o f difficulties created by the existing 
principles are too num erous to recount. As can be readily recognized, 
the cou rt’s finding o f liability will depend  upon the facts o f each case 
and the degree to which the court may be satisfied that a real effort was 
m ade by the union, th rough its representatives, to restrain  the 
com m encem ent and curtail the continuance o f the unlawful activities.
T o  a practitioner the real difficulty may arise in the initial stage o f 
properly form ulating pleadings in an action against a trade union. As 
illustrated by the Brunswick Contractors17 decision, if the action is founded 
upon a breach o f  contract it may not be sufficient to allege the existence 
o f the contract and the ‘no strike’ clause, the activities o f the m em bers of 
the trade union in breach o f such clause, and the liability o f the trade 
union therefore. Specific particulars o f the actvities o f the officials o f the 
trade union may not be then known.
Would it be sufficient, therefore, to plead that the officials did not, 
if applicable, attend at work as scheduled? Certain difficulties are 
immediately apparen t when consideration is given to construction trade 
unions where one local may exist for the entire Province and the 
officials th ereo f are full-time union employees. Does that m ean that 
liability could not attach to a construction trade union because there are 
no officials em ployed by a particular contractor?
It is subm itted that the courts should, in keeping with the various 
precedents set forth  previously in this paper, impose the rule o f strict 
liability upon trade unions in circum stances where a strike has occurred 
contrary to a collective agreem ent.
Pursuant to M cGavin Toastmasters'* the collective agreem ent is the 
relevant consideration. Following W innipeg B uilders'9 the negative
17Supra, footnote 5. 
'*Supra, footnote 13. 
'*Supra, footnote 1 1.
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covenant is being enforced against the very party that has contracted 
with the employer. In accordance with the Therien20 decision, the union 
as a legal entity must assume a responsibility to match the privileges 
granted to it under the labour legislation.
T he  imposition o f strict liability upon a trade union would clarify 
the issue o f pleadings. T h e  trade union would assume a prim a facie 
liability for the breach o f its undertaking, as was recognized by the 
Suprem e C ourt in the M aritime Employers2' decision.
T he  effect o f the adoption o f  a strict liability approach would be 
that a trade union, acting through its authorized officials, would carry 
the burden to establish that it was in fact, and not in fiction, not 
responsible for the com m encem ent and continuance o f the unlawful 
strike. T he  breach o f a no strike’ clause would impose the burden  o f 
proof upon the only party which, in reality, possesses the knowledge o f 
the facts sufficient to answer the allegation.
T he  imposition o f such a burden  would, it is subm itted, be entirely 
consistent with the intention o f the legislature in em pow ering trade 
unions with extra-ordinary  powers o f contract. For example, the 
inclusion o f a union shop’ clause in a collective agreem ent is permissable 
although the result may be the loss o f  em ploym ent by an employee.
T he application o f strict liability would thereby not require an 
em ployer to place itself in the minds, if not the bodies, o f  the trade 
union officials. It would also eliminate the need that presently exists for 
constant surveillance o f union officials du rin g  an unlawful strike. It 
would fu rtherm ore place a real, and not an imaginary, obligation upon 
the trade union to take internal disciplinary action against those 
m em bers who may be, in fact, the instigators o f the unlawful activity.
Most im portantly, strict liability o f a trade union for breach o f a ‘no 
strike’ clause would create a climate o f accountability. It would not be 
sufficient for union officials to appear to be directing the m em bership to 
re tu rn  to work. T h e  rule o f strict liability would require positive and real 
actions by those who should be responsible.
i0Supra, footnote I.
i 'Supra, footnote 14
